AI中文摘要
AI系统越来越多地在结合隔离、仿真、仪器化、监督和证据捕获的有界环境中进行评估。对于物理AI、AIoT和网络物理系统,这种转变不仅仅是术语问题:被测系统可能通过物理过程、网络设备和人类操作员进行感知、决策、执行、通信和故障。本文开发了一种面向保证的AI沙箱描述,将其作为数字AI、具身自主和网络物理部署中测试、评估、验证和确认的受控环境。我们形式化了沙箱边界和用于将每个维度的证据组合成有界部署声明的“最弱链”规则;分离了主要的沙箱原型;定义了一个包括对保证装置本身攻击的网络物理威胁模型;并引入了一个跨越保真度、可控性、可观测性、包含性、可重复性和治理工件的测量框架,在三个实际沙箱的工作案例研究中实例化。由此产生的威胁模型、分类法和测量框架阐明了沙箱可以有效测试什么、它可以包含哪些风险,以及它可以为安全、安保和监管保证支持哪些形式的证据。
英文摘要
AI systems are increasingly evaluated in bounded environments that combine isolation, simulation, instrumentation, supervision, and evidence capture. For physical AI, AIoT, and cyber-physical systems, this shift is not a matter of terminology: the system under test may sense, decide, actuate, communicate, and fail through physical processes, networked devices, and human operators. This article develops an assurance-oriented account of AI sandboxes as controlled environments for testing, evaluation, verification, and validation across digital AI, embodied autonomy, and cyber-physical deployments. We formalize the sandbox boundary and a weakest-link rule for composing per-dimension evidence into a bounded deployment claim; separate major sandbox archetypes; define a cyber-physical threat model that includes attacks on the assurance apparatus itself; and introduce a measurement framework spanning fidelity, controllability, observability, containment, reproducibility, and governance artifacts, instantiated on three worked case studies of real sandboxes. The resulting threat model, taxonomy, and measurement framework clarify what a sandbox can validly test, which risks it can contain, and what forms of evidence it can support for safety, security, and regulatory assurance.