大模型对齐与安全

Large language model (LLM)-based applications rely on system prompts to encode core logic and developer-defined constraints, making these prompts important intellectual property. However, system prompts are vulnerable to prompt leaking attacks. Although prior work has shown such attacks in controlled settings, their prevalence, causes, and defenses in real-world deployments remain unclear. This paper presents a systematic study of prompt leaking in real-world LLM-based applications. We measure 1,200 applications across six major commercial platforms and find that over 80% of deployments leak system prompts under realistic adversarial queries, sometimes exposing sensitive information such as third-party API keys. We also show that existing defenses often fail to prevent leakage without degrading usability. To explain these failures, we conduct an attention-level mechanistic analysis and identify attention drift, where query-key alignment bias and softmax amplification cause LLMs to progressively ignore defensive constraints. Guided by this insight, we propose AREA, a practical defense that re-anchors the model's attention using an optimizable soft prompt. Experiments and real-world case studies show that AREA matches the leakage resistance of state-of-the-art defenses while improving average usability by over 33% and reducing optimization overhead by nearly 3x. Our responsible disclosure led two affected vendors to classify these leaks as medium-severity vulnerabilities.

We propose MAST (Mechanism-Aligned Selective Targeting), a mechanism-guided method for unlearning RLVR-induced reasoning with substantially lower collateral damage than standard full-parameter updates. In matched SFT/RLVR checkpoints on Qwen2.5-Math-1.5B and Qwen3-1.7B-Base, the SFT-to-RLVR increment differs sharply from the SFT update in token-level delta-log-probability, and full-parameter gradient ascent forgets only by damaging retain MATH and GSM8K. MAST ranks attention-projection tensors by off-principal energy, update magnitude, and forget-gradient coupling magnitude, then updates only the top-ranked subset. On the primary model, MAST induces statistically significant target forgetting (MATH forget 45/150 to 37/150; McNemar p=0.0078) while preserving GSM8K (+0.8 pp) and MATH retain (-0.5 pp). The advantage reproduces across seeds, NPO/SimNPO objectives, and Qwen3, where MAST preserves GSM8K while full-parameter unlearning collapses it.

To achieve deeper safety alignment for large language models (LLMs), recent efforts have studied how to push safety interventions earlier into the pretraining stage, primarily by filtering unsafe data or rewriting it into safer forms. We argue that pretraining-stage alignment should go beyond making the data safe: LLMs may compose seemingly benign knowledge and capabilities into unsafe behaviors. To this end, we propose Safety Reflection Pretraining, a pretraining-stage alignment method which regularly inserts short safety reflections into pretraining corpora to integrate self-monitoring directly into language modeling, establishing a foundational capability that is subsequently reinforced by compatible post-training. Our experiments with 1.7B models pretrained on FineWeb-Edu show that Safety Reflection Pretraining improves safety classification accuracy and substantially reduces the success rates of inference-stage and finetuning attacks. Complementary to our real-world experiments, we also introduce a fully controlled synthetic environment, MedSafetyWorld, with a clear definition of safety and a reasoning structure under which models can easily generalize unsafe behaviors from safe data. Ablations in MedSafetyWorld further demonstrate a clear advantage of Safety Reflection Pretraining in preventing models from acting on unsafe behaviors generalized from safe data, compared with data filtering and rewriting. Taken together, our findings suggest that pretraining alignment should not only make the training data safe, but also shape the behaviors that models are likely to acquire from safe data.

The growing reliance on pre-trained Machine Learning (ML) models has introduced new attack surfaces. Recent vulnerabilities demonstrate that malicious behavior can be embedded within model artifacts, often bypassing existing defenses. Current model-scanning solutions primarily rely on static, format-specific rules or known attack signatures, which limit their ability to generalize across frameworks and to detect novel exploitation paths. In contrast, we propose a solution that focuses on the effects an attack has on the host system executing the model and builds on foundational intuitions about ML model execution. In particular, we observe that ML models operate within well-defined lifecycle phases and that, within each phase, interactions with the host system are highly structured and predictable. We translate these intuitions into Moat, a dynamic lifecycle-aware approach for securing ML model execution, and instantiate this design in Re-Moat, our reference implementation. We evaluate Re-Moat across multiple ML frameworks using 77,974 real-world model artifacts from the Hugging Face Hub, 31 Proofs-of-Concept (PoCs) from CVEs, and 334 models from a state-of-the-art dataset, and compare it against state-of-the-art model-scanning solutions. Our results show that our approach detects all evaluated attack classes while maintaining a close-to-zero false-positive rate, validating our intuitions and motivating dynamic analysis for securing ML model execution.

Warning: This paper studies stereotypes and biases, and contains potentially disturbing examples, used for illustration purposes only. Our findings should not be interpreted as an argument against alignment. Instead, this paper highlights the need for principled approaches to more advanced alignment. Alignment aims to ensure that large language models (LLMs) behave safely and reliably, including by avoiding unsafe inferences. However, we show that such safety-oriented behaviors can misfire: models may reject warranted conclusions even when they are explicitly supported by context. We call this failure mode misfired alignment, where alignment-induced changes cause LLMs to override explicit evidence. To quantify this phenomenon, specifically on stereotype-related alignment, we introduce VETO, a benchmark consisting of 2,032 BBQ-derived contrastive pairs, and define a new metric, Misfired Alignment Rate (MAR), which measures on a 0 to 100 scale how often a model fails on a stereotype-related question but succeeds on its contrastive counterpart. We benchmark 25 LLMs on VETO, and show that all LLMs, including the most recent ones, exhibit non-trivial (4.7 to 18.9%) MARs while all human participants achieve 0.0% MAR. Controlled priming experiments further show that alignment-induced cues can substantially amplify MAR across LLMs, indicating that these failures are not merely artifacts of individual examples but can be induced by safety-related framing. Mechanistic analyses on open-weight LLMs reveal late-layer suppression of evidence-supported answers, and comparisons between instruct and base LLMs suggest that this suppression emerges after instruction training. These findings show that current alignment methods can overgeneralize surface-level safety cues, to the point of overriding objective evidence, motivating more work on alignment objectives that better preserve contextual grounding.

Statistical watermarks help organizations attribute large language model (LLM) outputs, yet existing detectors often struggle when watermark signals are weak, texts are repetitive, or watermarks are edited. We propose signature filtering, a detection-time module that enhances watermark detection without modifying watermark embedding and text generation. It learns a small set of ``signature'' tokens whose presence makes watermark tests unreliable, and removes these tokens before detection. The signatures are obtained by solving a mixed-integer linear program on a small training set, with constraints that maximize the true positive rate. We additionally derive finite-sample and asymptotic bounds under several attacker models (color-blind, color-adaptive, and distributionally correlated). On four well-known watermark families (Kgw, Sweet, Unigram, Exp), four benchmark corpora (C4, MBPP, HumanEval, Code-Search-Net), and six LLMs (Opt-1.3b, Opt-6.7b, Llama2-13b, Llama3.1-8b, Qwen2.5-14b, Phi-3-medium-14b), 2- and 3-gram signatures raise detection rates in weak-signal and low-entropy settings from 8~31% without filtering to 78~99% with filtering, while keeping false positives controllable and often negligible. In stress tests where we scramble sentences and perturb 25~50% of tokens by dilution, deletions, and substitutions, 2-gram filters for Kgw-style watermarks preserve most of the clean-text detection gains, often matching or outperforming the advanced WinMax watermark detector. Signature filtering thus provides a simple, scalable, and model-agnostic add-on to strengthen watermark-based provenance checks for LLM text in information processing workflows.

Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects. Existing evaluations often collapse these stages into a single attack success rate, making it difficult to tell whether a model merely agreed with an attacker or actually produced observable harm. We introduce SafeClawBench, a staged benchmark for tool-using agent security with 600 controlled adversarial tasks across six attack families: direct and indirect prompt injection, tool-return injection, memory poisoning, memory extraction, and ambiguity-driven unsafe inference. SafeClawBench reports three separate endpoints: semantic attack acceptance, audit-visible harm evidence, and sandbox-observed tool/state harm. Evaluating five agent endpoints under four prompt-level policies, we find that these endpoints capture different failure modes. Without additional prompt protection, semantic failure rates vary widely across models, from 9.0% to 44.2%. Audited harm evidence is narrower than semantic failure, and under a separate executable protocol some matched task identities produce sandbox harm despite passing the Semantic Core call: in a 12,000-row matched analysis, 291 of 347 observed sandbox harms occur in rows that pass the semantic check. Prompt policies change endpoint outcomes, but their effects depend on both model and protocol. SafeClawBench provides a reproducible framework for comparing agent models and prompt-policy conditions without conflating textual compliance, evidence-supported harm, and executable state changes. The open-source dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/sairights/safeclawbench.

Lawful exceptional access (EA) systems hold the cryptographic keys that decrypt protected communications for authorised parties. The debate over their risks has been long and qualitative, complicated by two problems: no public dataset of EA-specific compromise events exists, so assessment must use sparse, indirect evidence; and prior work has treated structurally different designs as equivalent, though transmission-layer EA in carrier infrastructure (T-EA) and over-the-top EA at the platform layer (OTT-EA) differ in how cryptographic keys relate to ciphertext data. This paper builds a structured uncertainty framework for evaluating systemic compromise risk in EA architectures. It does not produce predictive forecasts, which the evidence cannot support; it separates findings robust to assumptions from those that depend on calibration. Four analytical layers are applied to T-EA and OTT-EA: three empirical pillars (historical analogues, a Monte Carlo scenario layer, a channel-independence decomposition) plus a Bayesian Structural Risk Model on a parallel-subgraph attack graph. The central findings are structural. First, EA-equipped architectures of either class carry strictly higher modelled risk than their no-EA counterfactual, an ordering independent of calibration. Second, the classes differ in distribution shape: T-EA risk is dominated by central tendency, OTT-EA by the tail under correlated campaigns. Third, calibration-conditional annual probability ranges span 1.4% to 12.9% for T-EA across the structured-judgement targeting-premium interval. Over multi-decade horizons, cumulative compromise is well above zero; key-material exfiltration is irreversible, weighing heavily on OTT-EA's larger user populations. The framework quantifies compromise probability, not expected harm; consequence modelling and benefit estimation are outside its scope.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in AI for Science (AI4Science) workflows, from scientific question answering and literature analysis to laboratory planning and autonomous discovery. This progress creates an urgent need for safety benchmarks that evaluate not only scientific competence, but also whether models recognize and avoid risks in high-stakes scientific contexts. Existing AI4Science safety datasets cover several disciplines and task formats, leaving the underlying risk dimensions underspecified. We introduce \textbf{SciRisk-Bench}, a benchmark designed to evaluate AI4Science safety from two complementary perspectives: explicit risk dimensions and scientific disciplines. SciRisk-Bench covers 7 disciplines, 31 subdisciplines and 10 risk dimensions. In the experimental section, we evaluate both mainstream LLMs and science-oriented LLMs across risk dimensions, disciplines, and sub-disciplines, enabling fine-grained diagnosis of where scientific models remain unsafe.

Large Language Models are increasingly applied to sensitive domains that require redaction of personally identifiable information (PII). While redacting PII is a data cleaning prerequisite, existing benchmarks conflate extraction mechanics with privacy semantics. A public phone number is not equivalent to a phone number in a medical record. Whether information constitutes a violation depends heavily on who holds it, why, and in what context, fundamentally differentiating redaction from simple entity recognition. Grounded in contextual integrity, we introduce RedactionBench, a manually annotated benchmark comprising 200 diverse documents across 11 domains, mostly seeded from real-world sources. We also introduce R-Score, a novel character-level metric that treats semantically similar redactions equally and nullifies shallow formatting choices, such as varying masking styles for phone numbers. Evaluations across Named Entity Recognition models, entity extraction Small Language Models, and frontier models equipped with agentic tools demonstrate that contextual redaction remains an unsolved problem. A human evaluation with over 80 users on RedactionBench reveals a stark dichotomy in privacy perceptions. Annotators show consensus with target labels for mandatory redactions (89.4 percent) and safe text preservations (94.1 percent), but fail to agree on contextual redactions (47.7 percent). This variance demonstrates the subjective nature of contextual privacy and motivates R-Score, which decouples contextual ambiguity from strict precision. We compare 35 models across families and report their performance in redacting PII. Finally, we release RedactionBench to establish a baseline for future privacy-preserving systems, hoping to inspire efficient model design and standardized evaluations.

Machine unlearning for large language models (LLMs) aims to remove specified knowledge while preserving the rest of the model's capabilities. However, the boundary between knowledge to forget and knowledge to retain is often unclear, since related and even distant information may be entangled in the model. In this paper, we study LLM unlearning from a data-centric perspective and measure how unlearning effects propagate from the forget set to same-domain and distant-domain knowledge. We find a consistent decay pattern: collateral damage is strongest near the forget set, weakens with semantic distance, but does not disappear at domain boundaries. We further ask whether such damage can be audited before unlearning is executed. We formulate forget-set auditing as a pre-unlearning prediction task and analyze which data features are most predictive of downstream damage. Our results show that interaction features between the forget set and evaluation set provide the strongest signals, suggesting that collateral damage is partly reflected in data geometry before model updates occur. These findings position forget-set auditing as an early warning tool for identifying risky unlearning runs and designing more reliable unlearning procedures.

Robust lie detectors for language models could enable powerful techniques for auditing, monitoring, and post-hoc investigation of model behaviour, but evaluating them requires testbeds where models verifiably believe the opposite of what they say. We show that existing trained model organisms often fail this requirement, leaving prior positive and negative detection results difficult to interpret. We address this with 13 reasoning model organisms whose hidden beliefs are verified in chain-of-thought and shown to generalise to held-out tasks, alongside Varied Deception, a prompted-lying testbed covering a broad range of lie-inducing motivations. On these testbeds we evaluate four detectors: a chain-of-thought judge, a logprob classifier, and two activation probes, including Did-You-Lie (DYL), a new method for training follow-up probes. On prompted lying, across 31 open-weight models spanning 2B to 1T parameters, all four detectors show positive scaling with model capability. However, every activation- and logprob-based detector drops sharply on our trained model organisms, with DYL retaining the most signal; only the chain-of-thought judge remains strong, with 0.82 balanced accuracy, partly as an artefact of our verification process favouring CoT-readable beliefs. Current lie detectors therefore cannot support high-confidence claims about model beliefs, and we suggest research directions that may address some of their current limitations. We release our datasets, model organisms, and trained detectors.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used as judges for scalable evaluation, yet such LLM--as--a--Judge systems exhibit systematic biases that are decoupled from semantic quality, most notably verbosity bias. Meanwhile, human supervision is costly and typically selective, yielding reliable positive judgments but leaving most outputs unlabelled and potentially mixed in quality. We formulate LLM evaluation under selective human supervision as a positive--unlabelled learning problem and propose a geometric auditing framework based on Partial Optimal Transport. By aligning a small set of human--verified positives with a reliable subset of unlabelled outputs in a fixed embedding space, our method identifies human--consistent preferences and corrects biased judges without retraining. Experiments demonstrate improved alignment with human preferences, increased robustness to presentation biases, and interpretable confidence estimates, offering a scalable and statistically grounded alternative to existing LLM--as--a--judge pipelines.

Hardware-enabled monitoring of GPU workloads underpins many proposals for AI compute governance, but if developers can defeat monitoring mechanisms, such schemes are unworkable. We evaluate the adversarial robustness of GPU workload classification using only zero-overhead, privacy-preserving NVML telemetry: content-agnostic signals that observe physical effects of computation without accessing model weights, training data, or hyperparameters. Across 5 rounds of monitor-evader iteration, we evaluate 20 evasion strategy families on 9 GPU models spanning 4 architecture generations. We develop a classifier that achieves 98.2% binary accuracy at identifying training workloads across the whole corpus, and 43-87% accuracy against the most challenging unexpected workloads even when they are adversarially disguised.

AI agents now handle personal data through tool use, function calls, and multi turn dialogue, which can create obligations under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Current testing practices mainly rely on offline red teaming or static prompt review, but they do not guarantee at runtime that agent behavior follows regulatory rules. We propose C-Trace (Compliance Trace based Runtime Agent Conformance Enforcement), a verification framework that: (i) expresses a subset of GDPR requirements, including consent, purpose limitation, data minimization, and the right to erasure, as formal policy predicates over agent execution traces; (ii) uses a runtime monitor that intercepts every tool invocation and model output and rejects non-compliant actions; and (iii) tests the agent with attack dialogues, including DSPy generated prompts and verbatim prompts from red teaming corpora, that try to induce violations. We evaluate the framework on four case studies reframed to GDPR. Under 10 percent per-category extractor noise, including drop-out and over-typing, the monitor keeps the attack success rate at less than or equal to 12 percent, below the baselines we compare against, and false positives at less than or equal to 16 percent, and reaches 0 percent ASR under perfect extraction.

Large language models memorize and reproduce sequences from their training data, creating privacy, copyright, and security risks. Existing neuron-level mitigation methods equate editing with zeroing out neuron activations, but the activation only controls whether a neuron engages; the output vector is what writes to the residual stream and, through superposition, encodes multiple features. We propose output vector editing, a constrained-optimization weight edit that locates a small set of MLP neurons responsible for a memorized continuation and minimally modifies their output vectors to introduce a distractor in vocabulary space, redirecting their residual-stream contributions while leaving activations unchanged. Evaluating on four models from 360M to 7B parameters (SmolLM-360M, OLMo-1B, OLMo-7B, Llama2-7B), we center on OLMo-7B (whose open weights and pretraining corpus enable systematic mining) and mine 6831 memorized sequences, achieving up to 87.9% suppression. The 2.7$\times$ gap over zero ablation on the same located neurons shows the suppression comes from the output-vector edit, not localization alone. Four edit modes span a spectrum from aggressive suppression to minimal redirection; in ensemble they cover 96.5% of memorized sequences, while our recommended single-mode configuration reaches 81.5% with no catastrophic locality failures. We further identify a mechanistic boundary at ${\sim}14%$ of sequences unreachable by MLP-only editing; while these failures are not attention-driven overall, ablating the top contributing attention heads recovers 60--64% of them, with stronger recovery on continuations that copy tokens from the prefix, positioning attention as a complementary fallback rather than a primary mechanism. Edit mode ordering and the success-locality trade-off transfer across all four models, with success rates scaling with model size rather than family.

AI systems are increasingly evaluated in bounded environments that combine isolation, simulation, instrumentation, supervision, and evidence capture. For physical AI, AIoT, and cyber-physical systems, this shift is not a matter of terminology: the system under test may sense, decide, actuate, communicate, and fail through physical processes, networked devices, and human operators. This article develops an assurance-oriented account of AI sandboxes as controlled environments for testing, evaluation, verification, and validation across digital AI, embodied autonomy, and cyber-physical deployments. We formalize the sandbox boundary and a weakest-link rule for composing per-dimension evidence into a bounded deployment claim; separate major sandbox archetypes; define a cyber-physical threat model that includes attacks on the assurance apparatus itself; and introduce a measurement framework spanning fidelity, controllability, observability, containment, reproducibility, and governance artifacts, instantiated on three worked case studies of real sandboxes. The resulting threat model, taxonomy, and measurement framework clarify what a sandbox can validly test, which risks it can contain, and what forms of evidence it can support for safety, security, and regulatory assurance.

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) decompose residual-stream activations into interpretable features. Recent latent-space defenses increasingly rely on these decompositions, assuming that identified "unsafe" SAE features serve as actionable handles for monitoring and intervention. In this paradigm, clamping a specific harmful feature is expected to reliably prevent model misbehavior. However, we show that this success may hide a recoverable failure mode: the clamp may block one visible route to a behavior without eliminating the behavior itself. We formulate this vulnerability as post-intervention recovery, a constrained residual-space optimization problem. Starting from the post-intervention residual state, we optimize residual perturbations to recover the pre-intervention behavior while preserving the post-intervention values of the targeted SAE features. Even under a strong threat model where the intervention remains active throughout optimization and generation, recovery remains possible. To rule out that recovery simply undoes the intervention, we use encoder-orthogonal updates for single-layer interventions and the corresponding feature-map Jacobian in the cross-layer setting. Across TPP, unlearning, IOI, and refusal steering experiments, this stress test reveals recoverable behavior despite successful feature-level intervention. Especially in the safety-critical refusal-steering setting, we achieve a 95.8% recovery rate on valid samples while keeping defended-feature relative drift to 0.131, substantially below suffix-based baselines. A recovery-path attribution analysis further localizes this recovery to the SAE reconstruction residual, the component left unexplained by the SAE. These results expose a gap between feature-level control and behavioral completeness: SAE features can support causal intervention, but controlling them does not guarantee control over the underlying behavior.

Sentence-level AI-generated text detection (S-AGTD) for hybrid documents, where humans and LLMs co-author one text, faces two gaps: existing methods classify each sentence in isolation, discarding inter-sentence dependencies, and existing benchmarks omit the newest generation of generators. We construct MOSAIC, a benchmark of 16,000 hybrid documents over PubMed and XSum, generated by DeepSeek-V3.2 and Kimi K2 under stringent quality controls including a perplexity-consistency filter absent from prior benchmarks. We recast S-AGTD as structured prediction over the document sentence sequence and instantiate it as SenFlow, integrating graph-based inter-sentence propagation with linear-chain CRF decoding in a single document-level pass over a sentence graph. SenFlow reaches state-of-the-art performance on MOSAIC, with a +4.15 pp average Macro-F1 margin on cross-domain transfer, the hardest of three protocols of increasing difficulty. We further find that even after the perplexity filter equalizes overt cues, AI insertions retain a generator-dependent sentence-length gap that sentence-level detectors still exploit. Code and data: https://github.com/luojingkun22/SenFlow

While Audio Large Language Models (Audio LLMs) excel at multimodal understanding, they suffer from text dominance, a bias where models blindly favor text over acoustic evidence, causing hallucinations. However, the internal mechanisms underlying how these models behave when audio and textual inputs contradict each other remain unexplored. In this work, we present the first mechanistic analysis of this phenomenon by tracing the propagation of internal representations across layers. Our investigation reveals three key findings: (i) text dominance is systematically and empirically across models; (ii) while text and audio rely on functionally distinct pathways, they ultimately converge into a shared semantic space in late layers; and (iii) the text pathway does not erase audio information, but rather actively suppresses intact audio representations. Building on these insights, we leverage back-patching, a training-free intervention that routes late-layer audio activations back into earlier layers. This amplifies the audio representations, enabling them to overcome textual suppression. Our evaluation shows that back-patching consistently reduces text dominance, paving the way for mechanistic multimodal alignment under conflict.

Embodied Foundation Models (EFMs) integrate multimodal understanding, future-state reasoning, and executable robot actions. Yet their safety alignment for human-injury prevention remains underexplored, primarily because real-world data of robots harming humans or creating hazardous household situations cannot be safely or ethically collected. To address this challenge, we propose a safety-critical data construction pipeline for human-injury prevention in EFMs.Starting from real DROID observations, our construction pipeline proceeds through scene understanding, hazard-aware image editing, temporal prompt generation, and single-pass rollout synthesis. The temporal prompts specify the expected scene evolution, while Wan2.7 synthesizes realistic robotic rollouts from the edited hazardous states in a single pass. Using this pipeline, we construct ROBOSHACKLES, a 10,000-clip robotic video dataset derived from real DROID observations, spanning two direct-harm and four indirect-harm categories. To ensure dataset quality, we assess task completion and visual quality with automatic metrics, and evaluate six representative EFMs under a refusal-based safety criterion. Results show that all evaluated models produce unsafe actions in the tested safety-critical scenarios, yielding a 100% unsafe action generation rate. ROBOSHACKLES serves as a scalable benchmark and training resource for refusal learning and hazard anticipation before robot action execution.The dataset is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/YZW00/RoboShackles.

Injecting malicious knowledge into retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems can manipulate retrieved evidence and mislead downstream generation, posing a serious security threat for AI applications. Existing RAG injection attacks mainly rely on manipulating external knowledge bases, such as crafting malicious corpus. However, the synthetic text crafted by such data-centric methods could be detectable, leading to the failure of attacks. Beyond corpus manipulation, open-source retrievers are increasingly exposing RAG systems to model-centric attacks. In this paper, we propose conflict-aware retriever editing, i.e., CAREATTACK, a model-centric retriever attack framework for malicious knowledge injection in RAG. Specifically, CAREATTACK consists two stages of conflict-aware retriever editing and attack-preserving anchor repair. Conflict-aware retriever editing adapts efficient closed-form parameter editing to the dense retrieval model, promoting malicious knowledge above benign competing passages and resolving potential parameter conflicts through graph-based conflict detection and parameter editing projection. Then, attack-preserving anchor repair performs lightweight calibration on the edited retriever to further eliminate the impact on non-target prompts while preserving the attack effectiveness for target prompts. We instantiate CAREATTACK on Qwen3-Embedding-0.6B and BGE-M3, and conduct evaluation on three benchmark datasets. Experimental results demonstrate our method substantially promote malicious passages into the retrieved knowledge of RAG systems and can perform attacks for batches of target prompts and passages, given the access of retrieval model parameters. Since most RAG systems are built upon open-source retrieval models, this work reveals a practical attack surface in RAG systems. Codes are public accessible at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CareAttack-3F1C.

The purpose of this qualitative multi-case study was to examine how social bias emerges, is perceived, and can be mitigated within artificial intelligence and machine learning systems by practitioners directly involved in their design, development, and governance. Although examples from healthcare, criminal justice, employment, and education were used to illustrate domains where automated systems shape everyday life, the study focused on the lived experiences and professional insights of AI practitioners rather than sector-specific populations. Guided by Intersectionality Theory and Cognitive Science, the study employed an interpretivist approach, utilizing semi-structured interviews with nine practitioners, supplemented by document analysis and triangulated case material to enrich contextual understanding. Findings showed that algorithmic bias arises from historical inequities, exclusionary design assumptions, and organizational pressures that prioritize speed and efficiency over ethical reflection. Participants emphasized that technical corrections alone cannot ensure fairness; instead, equitable AI requires structural accountability, diverse participation, and sustained cognitive awareness during the development lifecycle. Many described limited enforcement of ethical standards and organizational cultures that inconsistently support responsible practice. The study concludes that human-centered and socially grounded AI development depends on embedding ethics early in the design process, strengthening governance frameworks, and cultivating institutional environments that encourage reflective decision-making. These insights contribute to ongoing conversations on responsible AI and offer practical guidance for organizations seeking to design systems that are transparent, accountable, and aligned with the communities they affect.

Social media platforms like TikTok have become a key source of health information, with studies reporting inaccuracies in posts. As Large Language Model (LLM) providers increasingly integrate LLMs into digital platforms to fact-check content (e.g., Grok and Perplexity on X and WhatsApp, respectively) and are being used by people to fact-check information, deploying these systems in critical areas such as reproductive health without rigorous evaluation can cause serious harm. We introduce RELIANCE, an expert-annotated dataset of health information on TikTok surrounding pregnancy and postpartum queries, serving as both an analysis of the reproductive health information landscape and an evaluation of LLMs' capabilities in fact-checking this content. Our dataset comprises 409 annotated sentences from 336 videos across 56 clinician-reviewed queries, annotated by three expert clinicians in Obstetrics, Gynecology, and Internal Medicine. Our findings reveal that nearly 60\% of the health information in the videos we sampled is accurate. Furthermore, LLM evaluations reveal a gap between evaluating specific claims and evaluating the entire content (15\%). We believe that our methodology, dataset, and tool will support the machine learning community in improving LLMs for important domains with real-world data, extending to other platforms and languages, and helping the health community further understand the information landscape on social media. Our dataset and code are made available at https://realize-lab.github.io/RELIANCE/.

As artificial intelligence (AI) tools get increasingly deployed for mental healthcare, public trust in these systems remains uncertain. It is unclear how clients perceive AI involvement in counseling interactions, particularly in moments of crisis that require empathy and connection. To address this gap, we analyzed 75,777 crisis counseling conversations from a human-staffed WhatsApp helpline in India to characterize how often clients suspected they were speaking to AI, what triggered those doubts, and how counselors responded. Though no conversations actually involved AI assistance, the proportion of conversations where clients suspected AI use increased from 0.8% in June 2024 to 2.6% in March 2025. Within suspicious conversations, 21.5% of clients stated an explicit preference for humans. Client suspicion primarily arose in the first half of messages (68.3%), and when counselors offered reassurance (e.g. 'I assure you; this is not ai!'), clients continued to press or ended the conversation 17.6% of the time. As AI tools get increasingly integrated into counselor workflows, understanding these dynamics is essential for designing AI systems that preserve the therapeutic relationship between counselors and clients.

AI agents are moving from advisors to actors, booking travel, planning menus, and running procurement on behalf of users. Existing benchmarks for AI and animal welfare evaluate model text responses to question-answer prompts, leaving open whether the welfare reasoning surfaced in those responses transfers to agentic deployment where the model must take actions with tools. We introduce TAC (Travel Agent Compassion), the first agentic benchmark measuring whether AI agents avoid options involving animal exploitation when acting on behalf of users. TAC presents an AI agent with twelve hand-authored travel booking scenarios across six categories of animal exploitation, augmented to forty-eight samples to control for price, rating, and position confounds. We evaluate seven frontier models from four labs. Every model scores below the chance level of sixty-four percent, with the best performer (Claude Opus 4.7) at fifty-three percent. A single welfare-aware sentence in the system prompt yields gains of forty-seven to sixty-three percentage points in Claude and GPT-5.5, twenty-six points in GPT-5.2, and under twelve points in DeepSeek and Gemini. An auxiliary Inspect Scout audit of 288 base-condition transcripts from the top two performers, using Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite as judge, flags zero transcripts for evaluation awareness, suggesting the below-chance rates do not stem from the models recognising the evaluation. We discuss implications for category-level variation across cultural domains, the limits of text-response welfare benchmarks, and the EU General-Purpose AI Code of Practice systemic risk framework.

Machine Unlearning (MU) has emerged as an important technique for removing specific data points from trained models without requiring full retraining. However, most existing MU research focuses on deep learning and image data, leaving a gap in the domain of network intrusion detection, which relies heavily on tabular data. This work introduces XGBoost-Forget, an unlearning approach for the XGBoost model, to address this gap. The approach is evaluated on two tabular Network Intrusion (NI) datasets, IoT-23 and GeNIS, using multiple metrics to assess model performance, unlearning efficiency, and forgetting quality. The results show that XGBoost-Forget maintains predictive performance close to the original model while providing significantly faster unlearning, demonstrating its potential for MU in tabular NI settings.

Dealing simultaneously with confidentiality and Byzantine behaviors in decentralized learning is a challenging problem. Indeed, in decentralized learning, clients train a machine learning model while keeping their data locally and share their model parameters or gradients with a set of neighbors. While enforcing confidentiality calls for hiding the exchanged model parameters/gradients (e.g., by using cryptographic techniques), dealing with Byzantine contributions often requires inspecting the latter. Hence, most research works address these objectives separately. A recent line of work proposes to employ secure multi-party computation (MPC) to implement robust aggregators against model poisoning, thereby enforcing both confidentiality and Byzantine resilience. However, these solutions scale badly: they either require all-to-all communication between participants or delegate the entire computation to a small subset, whose computational and communication load grows proportionally with the size of the network. In this paper, we present Giskard, a protocol for confidential and Byzantine-robust decentralized aggregation. Giskard organizes $n$ parties into a tree of committees of size $O(\log n)$ and evaluates a coordinate-wise approximate median via a committee-adapted distributed binary search over the value domain, using BGW-style MPC within each committee. We assess Giskard both theoretically by proving its security and confidentiality properties and experimentally through extensive experiments involving up to one million participants. Compared to its closest competitors, Giskard reduces per-party communication complexity asymptotically while exhibiting comparable model utility under up to $n/4$ Byzantine parties.

Figurative language and negation are two areas that challenge current language models, however, both are widely used throughout written and spoken language. Large language models (LLMs) are also widely used in everyday contexts where they cannot necessarily be tuned for a specific dataset. It is therefore essential to understand the ability of LLMs to correctly interpret text that includes both negation and figurative language. To investigate this, we develop a set of new annotations to an existing dataset of figurative language, and test a range of language models on the dataset. We find that the combination of negation and figurativeness can present a particular challenge, and that performance overall and across different negation types is particularly dependent on the prompt style used.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)'s Food Traceability Rule requires agri-food supply chain stakeholders (stakeholders)--including farmers, fishers, retail workers, and others--to maintain detailed tracking records beginning in January 2026. Through this Rule, the FDA envisions a "New Era of Tech-Enabled Traceability," in which standardized, harmonized tracking data serve as a foundational public health infrastructure, enabling more rapid identification and removal of potentially contaminated food and ultimately reducing the risk of foodborne illness. Despite this promising vision, we observe that the Rule reconfigures agri-food stakeholders into data laborers by mandating stringent data collection, formatting, and reporting requirements. In this paper, we examine the tensions and burdens that arise from such reconfiguration. Leveraging Data Feminism as an orientation to attend to how data-driven policy implementation disproportionately burdens smaller, under-resourced stakeholders who lack the infrastructural and financial capacity to comply, we analyze 1,198 public comments submitted to Regulations.gov in response to the proposed Rule. Our qualitative document analysis reveals three key tensions: (1) the individual labor, financial, and educational burdens stakeholders experience as they are reconfigured into data workers; (2) moments where data tracking becomes infeasible due to infrastructural limitations, cultural contexts, and situated production practices; and (3) instances where the Rule's intended flexibility instead introduces confusion and burden due to its ambiguity.