AI中文摘要
自主代理越来越多地连接到云、部署和数据控制工作流,但生产环境的变更权限不应存在于非确定性推理过程中。现有的访问控制机制授权身份,而保证层认证提议的操作;两者单独都无法在变更时刻提供对认证权限的强制执行点。本文介绍了主权执行代理(SEB),一种用于证书绑定智能体基础设施的运行时强制边界。SEB消耗由主权保证边界(SAB)颁发的证书,验证请求的变更与认证的执行合约匹配,检查有效期窗口、策略时期、撤销时期和实时状态漂移,铸造范围执行身份,调用基础设施API,并记录签名的决策和结果记录。通过分离提议、准入和执行,SEB将认证权限转化为短暂的、可撤销的、可审计的运行时能力,前提是生产变更API拒绝非代理身份。我们展示了SEB执行模型、证书和重放验证谓词、范围身份语义、绕过预防部署模式、失败行为以及一个具体的原型实现。我们在AWS和Kubernetes集群上评估了原型,测量了延迟开销、撤销传播、漂移检测以及故障注入下的安全性。
英文摘要
Autonomous agents are increasingly connected to cloud, deployment, and data-control workflows, but production mutation authority should not reside inside non-deterministic reasoning processes. Existing access-control mechanisms authorize identities, while assurance layers certify proposed actions; neither alone provides a mandatory enforcement point for certified authority at the moment of mutation. This paper introduces the Sovereign Execution Broker (SEB), a runtime enforcement boundary for certificate-bound agentic infrastructure. SEB consumes certificates issued by the Sovereign Assurance Boundary (SAB), verifies that the requested mutation matches the certified execution contract, checks validity windows, policy epochs, revocation epochs, and live-state drift, mints scoped execution identity, invokes infrastructure APIs, and records signed decision and outcome records. By separating proposal, admission, and execution, SEB turns certified authority into a short-lived, revocable, auditable runtime capability, provided that production mutation APIs reject non-broker identities. We present the SEB execution model, certificate and replay-verification predicates, scoped identity semantics, bypass-prevention deployment patterns, failure behavior, and a concrete prototype implementation. We evaluate the prototype on AWS and Kubernetes clusters, measuring latency overheads, revocation propagation, drift detection, and security under fault injection.