Errors in risk valuation outputs arising from data-feed failures, model misconfiguration, or system malfunctions can propagate undetected through an investment bank's risk infrastructure and generate material operational losses. Using proprietary daily credit-derivatives data from a major global investment bank covering 183 trades across 129 trading days, we design, implement, and empirically evaluate the Ensemble Quality Assessment Framework (EQAF), a layered unsupervised architecture that combines complementary outlier-detection methods to monitor risk calculation integrity in real time. Using a controlled anomaly-injection protocol with eight operationally realistic scenarios, we show that the calibrated ensemble achieves F1 scores of 61-79%, substantially outperforming the best individual method (6-66%) across four distinct risk-measure datasets. Improvements of 4-6 percentage points in AUC-ROC confirm that this advantage is robust to threshold selection. We further demonstrate that purely statistical detection methods systematically fail to identify stale-value anomalies, a class of frozen-feed errors in which valuation outputs are identical to prior observations and therefore indistinguishable from normal data, and that domain-specific deterministic rules are architecturally indispensable. These findings have direct implications for model risk management under Basel III and the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB), where automated and auditable quality controls for internal risk models are increasingly required.

This paper develops a general framework for analyzing multi-agent systems with feedback loops between agents actions and collective observations. The framework is built on two fundamental agent-level variables: power, which measures agent influence on collective outcomes, and response functions, which determine how agents react to observations. We derive how macroscopic properties, including total power, useful power, entropy, order, fragility, and mobility, emerge from these two variables of heterogeneous agents. To study the trade off between growth and resilience, we introduce a system-level utility function parameterized by a risk-appetite coefficient and derive an optimal degree of order that balances productivity, stability, and adaptability. The analysis suggests that stronger synchronization can increase collective output but may also increase systemic fragility and reduce mobility. We further argue that order, entropy, information, and useful energy are task-dependent and system-relative concepts whose meanings depend on the objectives of the system. By measuring and designing agent power distributions and response functions, it may be possible to better understand, predict, and optimize collective behavior and identify the conditions under which collective intelligence and optimal order emerge.

Decentralized finance exposes supervisors to fast-moving, networked credit risks. General-purpose LLM agents fit this setting poorly: they over-read weak evidence and recommend high-stakes interventions, while existing evaluations offer no regulator-aligned way to measure the resulting false alarms. We introduce DeXposure-Claw, a forecast-grounded agentic supervision system that routes LLM decisions through structured evidence: (1) DeXposure-FM, a graph time-series foundation model, forecasts future exposure networks; (2) deterministic monitors and stress scenarios then turn those forecasts into typed alerts, attribution signals, and scenario evidence; and (3) data-health and confidence gates constrain escalation before DeXposure-Claw emits auditable supervisory tickets with rationales. We further develop DeXposure-Bench, a six-axis evaluation harness, whose decision axis scores tickets against a regulator-aligned absolute-loss ground truth and an explicit false-intervention rate. Experiments on five years of weekly real data fully support our system. Code is at https://github.com/EVIEHub/DeXposure-Claw.

We forecast future volatilities and correlations of financial markets based on the current trends in these markets. This complements previous work that models future expected returns by a cubic polynomial of the current trend strength. Empirically, we observe that volatilities and correlations tend to increase day after day in times of strong up- or down-trends. This effect is particularly pronounced in down-trends. It can be accurately quantified by quadratic polynomials of today's trend strengths, which refine common mean-reversion models of volatilities and correlations. Our results improve the prediction of market risk by accounting for market trends. They also support a recent proposal to model financial markets by a lattice gas near its critical point.

Paper A defines a time-consistent actuarial runtime that prices each side-effect-bearing action against a contractually fixed safe default and gates execution against a reserve budget. It treats the operator as passive. This paper makes the operator strategic. We characterise a five-attack space for autonomous AI-agent insurance contracts and prove when the actuarial runtime is gaming-resistant. Two attack surfaces -- post-toll safe-default selection and within-boundary action splitting -- are closed by Paper A's minimal-authority and no-splitting clauses. The remaining three require new contract clauses. First, common-control aggregation prevents cross-boundary re-routing from reducing toll below the boundary potential applied to total exposure. Second, interface failures such as invalid JSON are contract-relevant events, not safety wins: treating them as zero-toll safe defaults can reward unreliable models, while escalation fees reverse the incentive. We validate this interface-compliance theorem on committed cross-model traces from the companion empirical paper. Third, a model-identity menu with a componentwise-minimum penalty schedule makes truthful reporting of the deployed model weakly dominant. We then compose these clauses with Paper A's runtime guarantees to obtain joint incentive compatibility over the five-attack space. Finally, a two-parameter premium family discharges operator individual rationality and weak budget balance at the truthful equilibrium. The result is an incentive-compatibility layer for actuarial control of autonomous-agent side effects.