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2606.01650 2026-06-11 q-fin.PM q-fin.TR stat.AP stat.ME 版本更新

Post Selection Estimation of Sharpe Ratios

夏普比率的事后选择估计

Steven E. Pav

AI总结 针对从众多资产中选择具有最高样本内夏普比率的资产,研究基于多面体引理、James-Stein收缩、期望最大夏普比率去偏、阈值法和经验贝叶斯的估计器,并通过模拟评估其偏差、均方根误差和秩相关性。

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AI中文摘要

我们考虑估计一个资产的真实夏普比率的问题,该资产因在众多资产中具有最高的样本内夏普比率而被选中。我们讨论了基于多面体引理、James-Stein收缩、期望最大夏普比率去偏、阈值法和经验贝叶斯的估计器。我们在模拟中测试了这些估计器,计算了不同样本量、资产数量以及总体夏普比率的分布范围和形状下的偏差和均方根误差。我们还计算了估计器与潜在真实值的秩相关性,模拟了这些估计器如何用于比较或排序执行此选择过程的不同团队的结果。我们发现James-Stein估计器在相关参数的许多不同实际值下提供了最佳性能,其次是Jiang和Zhang的GMLEB估计器。这些结果对资产收益的相关性相当稳健,但有一些注意事项。

英文摘要

We consider the problem of estimating the true Sharpe ratio of an asset selected for having the highest observed in-sample Sharpe ratio among many assets. We discuss estimators based on the polyhedral lemma, James Stein shrinkage, debiasing the expected maximum Sharpe ratio, thresholding and empirical Bayes. We test these estimators in simulations, computing bias and root mean square error across different values of sample size, number of assets, and spread and shape of population Sharpe ratios. We also compute rank correlation of the estimators against the underlying quantity, simulating how these estimators might be used to compare or rank the output of different teams which perform this selection process. We find that the James Stein estimator provides the best performance across many different realistic values of the relevant parameters, followed by the GMLEB estimator of Jiang and Zhang. These results are fairly robust to correlation of asset returns, with some caveats.

2504.06717 2026-06-11 q-fin.TR 版本更新

Optimal Execution and Macroscopic Market Making

最优执行与宏观市场做市

Ivan Guo, Shijia Jin

AI总结 提出一个随机博弈模型,刻画做市商与交易者之间的策略互动,通过FBSDEs刻画纳什均衡,并在特定模型中建立全局适定性,模拟揭示报价与策略订单负相关。

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42 pages
AI中文摘要

我们提出了一个随机博弈模型,模拟做市商与交易者之间的策略互动。从交易者的角度来看,传统的外生永久价格影响被做市商的内生报价策略所取代。相反,从做市商的角度来看,订单流不再假设为外生,而是由策略交易者内生驱动。通过前向-后向随机微分方程(FBSDEs)刻画纳什均衡,我们建立了该一般博弈的局部适定性结果。对于特定的“Almgren-Chriss-Avellaneda-Stoikov”模型,解耦方法通过将其简化为具有$M_+$-矩阵系数的后向随机Riccati方程,保证了FBSDEs的全局适定性。最后,通过将小扩散项引入库存过程作为一般博弈的近似,我们建立了其全局适定性。模拟揭示了报价与策略订单之间的负相关,这与报价与噪声订单之间的正相关形成对比。

英文摘要

We propose a stochastic game modelling the strategic interaction between market makers and traders. From the trader's perspective, the conventional exogenous permanent price impact is replaced by the endogenous quoting strategies of the market makers. Conversely, from the market maker's perspective, order flows are no longer assumed to be exogenous, but are driven endogenously by the strategic traders. Characterizing the Nash equilibria via forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs), we establish a local well-posedness result for the general game. For the specific `Almgren-Chriss-Avellaneda-Stoikov' model, the decoupling approach guarantees the global well-posedness of the FBSDEs by reducing it to a backward stochastic Riccati equation with $M_+$-matrix coefficients. Finally, by introducing small diffusion terms into the inventory processes as an approximation to the general game, we establish its global well-posedness. Simulations reveal a negative correlation between quotes and strategic orders, in contrast to the positive correlation observed between quotes and noise orders.