Epistemic fair division of independence structures
独立性结构的认知公平分配
Marcin Anholcer, Maciej Bartkowiak, Bartłomiej Bosek, Jarosław Grytczuk
AI总结 研究在独立性结构约束下(如网络中的无环边集)的公平分配问题,证明了当代理人数至少为图的树性时,存在至多一个物品嫉妒(EF1)的分配,并进一步对任意加性估值证明了认知EF1分配的存在性。
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我们研究了在由预设独立性结构(即物品子集族在取子集下封闭)施加约束下的不可分割物品公平分配问题。作为一个激励性例子,想象待分配的物品是物流、金融或社交网络中的可用连接。每个代理的允许物品组合必须对应一个无环边集,对应于要解决的线性网络问题的基本可行解。假设所有代理对每个物品赋予相同价值(在例子中,网络连接对每个代理同等重要),并通过求和物品价值来评估每个组合。是否存在将物品公平划分为这样的无环组合?令人惊讶的是,答案是肯定的,前提是代理人数至少为$G$的树性,且公平性要求为至多一个物品嫉妒(EF1)。当代理具有任意加性估值时,情况变得更加神秘。我们的主要结果保证了在这种情况下,认知EF1划分总是存在的,这意味着每个代理收到一个无环组合,对于该组合,存在剩余物品的一个可行划分,使得他们不嫉妒至多一个物品。我们从定义在物品集合上的抽象独立性结构的一般结果推导出这一结论。我们还讨论了与几个关于拟阵的猜想之间的联系。特别地,我们证明了任何可划分为两个独立集的哈密顿拟阵,对于共同单调估值承认一个EF1二分划分。我们通过一个建设性视角补充了我们的结果:我们明确提出了两种计算上述公平分配的算法。最后,我们提供了说明性示例,以在具体实例上演示这些算法。
We study the problem of fair division of indivisible goods with constraints imposed by a prescribed independence structure, that is, a family of subsets of goods closed under taking subsets. As a motivating example, imagine that the goods to be divided are the available connections in a logistic, financial, or social network. The admissible bundle of goods for each agent must correspond to an acyclic set of edges, corresponding to a basic feasible solution to a linear network problem to be solved. Suppose that all agents assign the same value to each good (in the example, the network connections are equally important for every agent) and evaluate each bundle by summing the values of its goods. Is there a fair partition of the goods into such acyclic bundles? Surprisingly, the answer is yes, provided that the number of agents is at least the arboricity of $G$, and the fairness requirement is envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). The situation becomes more mysterious when agents have arbitrary additive valuations. Our main result guarantees that, in this case, epistemic EF1 partitions always exist, which means that each agent receives an acyclic bundle for which there exists a feasible partition of the remaining goods into acyclic bundles that they do not envy up to one good. We derive this conclusion from a general result for abstract independence structures defined on the sets of goods. We also discuss connections with several conjectures concerning matroids. In particular, we prove that any Hamiltonian matroid partitionable into two independent sets admits an EF1 bipartition with respect to a common monotone valuation. We complement our results with a constructive perspective: we present explicitly two algorithms for computing the fair allocations described above. Finally, we provide illustrative examples to demonstrate these algorithms on specific instances.