Screening for Choice Sets
选择集的筛选
Tan Gan, Yingkai Li
AI总结 研究代理人私下知道可行行动或技术集,仅向委托人披露子集的筛选问题,通过包含序假设刻画最优机制,并应用于说服管理、行动激励和生产技术激励。
详情
我们研究了一个筛选问题,其中代理人私下知道哪些行动或技术是可行的,并且只能向委托人披露一个子集。一旦披露,可行选项是可验证的,其收益后果是公开已知的,因此私人信息涉及可行性而非收益,误报直接限制委托人的选择而非扭曲其信念。假设可行集按包含关系排序,我们建立了最优机制的简单刻画,其中委托人要么表现得好像没有不对称信息,要么局部地对更好的提议不提供奖励。我们推导了比较静态分析,并将该框架应用于说服管理、行动激励和生产技术激励等场景。
We study a screening problem in which an agent privately knows which actions or technologies are feasible and can disclose only a subset to a principal. Once disclosed, feasible options are verifiable and their payoff consequences are publicly known, so private information concerns feasibility rather than payoffs, misreporting restricts the principal's choices directly rather than distorting her beliefs. Assuming feasible sets are ordered by inclusion, we establish a simple characterization of the optimal mechanism, where the principal either behaves as if there is no asymmetric information or locally provides no reward for better proposals. We derive comparative statics and illustrate the framework in applications to managing persuasion, action elicitation, and production-technology elicitation.