Mean-field imitation dynamics on fast assortative networks
快速同配网络上的平均场模仿动力学
Benedict Russell, Andrew Nugent, Jacques Bara
AI总结 研究在快速演化加权网络上,自利个体进行连续策略囚徒困境博弈的模仿动力学,通过平均场极限分析噪声对合作涌现的影响,发现噪声可将确定性共识转化为稳定合作。
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结构化种群中合作的出现是人类社会成功的基础。物理和在线网络通过改变人们互动的对象来驱动行为变化,从而改变社会压力。在本文中,我们研究了在动态演化加权网络上进行连续策略囚徒困境博弈的自利个体种群中的模仿动力学。在快速网络机制下,我们将边权重纳入策略演化,然后推导并分析大种群平均场极限。在没有噪声的情况下,我们建立了适定性,并证明解坍缩为单个狄拉克质量。对于初始分离的簇,我们识别出一个支付阈值以及整体合作水平增加的充分条件。然后,我们引入随机策略更新,并在平均场极限中获得一个非局部福克-普朗克方程。我们严格证明了平稳分布的存在性和唯一性,并在足够噪声下证明了线性稳定性。数值实验表明,噪声可以将确定性共识转变为稳定的合作平稳行为。这些发现表明,快速自适应交互和随机探索可以共同支持种群水平上稳定合作的出现。
The emergence of cooperation in structured populations is fundamental to the success of human societies. Physical and online networks can drive behavioural change by altering who people interact with, thereby modifying social pressures. In this paper, we study imitation dynamics in a population of self-interested agents playing a continuous strategy Prisoner's Dilemma on a dynamically evolving weighted network. In the fast-network regime, we incorporate the edge weights into the strategy evolution before deriving and analysing the large population mean-field limit. Without noise, we establish well-posedness and show the solution collapses to a single Dirac mass. For initially separated clusters, we identify a payoff threshold and sufficient conditions for the overall level of cooperation to increase. We then introduce stochastic strategy updates, and obtain a non-local Fokker-Planck equation in the mean-field limit. We rigorously prove existence and uniqueness of stationary distributions, and show linear stability under sufficient noise. Numerics illustrate that noise can transform the deterministic consensus into stable cooperative stationary behaviour. These findings show that the fast adaptive interactions and stochastic exploration can jointly support the emergence of stable cooperation at a population level.