"Vibe coding" and "vibe analytics" have been framed as a democratization of technical capability. This paper argues that AI-assisted methodology more broadly, or what I call "vibe methodology," also democratizes the failure modes specific to each domain. When AI assists with methods whose validity depends on assumptions that cannot be verified from the output alone (a class I call "vibe inference"), the failure surface is structurally different: the output does not reliably signal invalidity, and when it does, recognizing the signal requires the expertise the workflow bypasses. I focus on "vibe econometrics," the subset of AI-assisted causal analysis where identification can be named faster than it can be audited. The claim of this paper is not that AI invents inferential failures that did not previously exist, but that it changes their incidence, observability, and persuasive force enough to create a practically distinct governance problem. This results in three failure modes: method-data mismatch, where AI bypasses expertise at execution; confidence laundering, where AI amplifies the credibility of formatted output; and invisible forking, which spans both. What is new is not the failure modes but AI's industrialization of their packaging. The barrier between naming a method and executing it has collapsed, and weak foundations, dressed as rigorous analysis, now reach audiences at a scale, speed, and polish that previously required expertise. I propose the Analysis Contract, a pre-commitment framework that adapts the logic of pre-analysis plans and the Causal Roadmap to the AI-assisted setting. The contract imposes three conditions before a causal claim is made: a method-data contract, a data audit, and a pre-commitment statement defining what would count as a disconfirming result. The framework generalizes across domains of vibe inference through domain-specific instantiation.

Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage equilibrium analysis in strategic scenarios, one must first elicit numerical utilities consistent with player preferences, a delicate and time-consuming process. In this work, we forgo precise utilities and generalize the Nash equilibrium to a setting where we only assume a player is capable of providing an ordinal ranking of their actions within the context of other players' joint actions. The key technical challenge is to rethink the definition of a best-response. While the classical definition identifies actions maximizing expected payoff, we naturally look towards social choice theory for how to aggregate preferences to identify the most preferred actions. We define this generalized notion of a context-ordinal Nash equilibrium, establish its existence under mild conditions on aggregation methods, introduce notions of regularization, approximation, and regret, explore complexity for simple settings, and develop learning rules for computing such equilibria. In doing so, we provide a generalization of Nash equilibrium and demonstrate its direct applicability to elicited preferences in human experiments.

Eliciting truthful reports from autonomous agents is a core problem in scalable AI oversight: a principal scores the agent's report using a strictly proper scoring rule, but the agent also benefits from the report through a non-accuracy channel (approval for autonomous action, allocation share, downstream control). The same structure appears in classical mechanism-design settings such as marketplace operation. Our main result is an endogeneity: the principal's optimal oversight necessarily uses a non-affine approval function to screen types, yet any non-affine approval makes truthful reporting suboptimal under the combined objective whenever deviation is undetectable. The principal cannot avoid the perturbation that undermines calibration. This impossibility holds for all strictly proper scoring rules, with a closed-form perturbation formula. A constructive escape exists: a step-function approval threshold achieves first-best screening for every strictly proper scoring rule, because the agent's binary inflate-or-not choice creates a type-space threshold regardless of the generator's curvature. Under the Brier score specifically, the type-independent inflation cost yields a welfare equivalence between second-best and first-best; we prove this equivalence is unique to Brier (the welfare gap under smooth $C^1$ oversight is bounded below by $Ω(\text{Var}(1/G'') (γ/β)^2)$ for every non-Brier rule). Two instances develop the framework: AI agent oversight (the lead motivating setting) and marketplace operation (a parallel mechanism-design domain). The message for AI alignment is direct: smooth scoring-based oversight cannot elicit truthful reports from a strategic agent; sharp thresholds are the calibration-preserving design.

We propose an aggregate notion of non-transferable utility (NTU) stability for decentralized matching markets with fixed prices, where market clearing is achieved through one-sided money burning, which can be interpreted as waiting. Agents are grouped into observable types and are indifferent among individuals within type; equilibrium is defined at the type level and delivers equal indirect utility within each type. We introduce money burning into two types of NTU models: In a deterministic model, we relate our notion to classical Gale--Shapley stability and show how money burning decentralizes stable outcomes under aggregation. We then introduce separable random utility, obtaining an NTU counterpart to Choo and Siow (2006). We prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and provide a stationary queueing interpretation. Finally, we develop a generalized deferred acceptance algorithm based on alternating constrained discrete-choice problems and prove its convergence to the unique equilibrium.

We show that the leading bubble test suffers severe size distortion when fundamentals incorporate general-purpose technology adoption. Embedding a hump-shaped technology shock in the Campbell-Shiller present-value model, we prove that the fundamental price becomes locally explosive during adoption, contaminating the test's limit distribution with a non-centrality parameter proportional to the shock's peak. We propose a fundamental-versus-speculative decomposition that projects prices onto observable technology proxies and applies the test to the residual. Empirically, the decomposition eliminates evidence of speculation in the 2020-2025 AI rally while confirming a speculative peak confined to December 1999-March 2000 in the dot-com episode.

Causal machine learning (ML) recovers graphical structures that inform us about potential cause-and-effect relationships. Most progress has focused on cross-sectional data with no explicit time order, whereas recovering causal structures from time series data remains the subject of ongoing research in causal ML. In addition to traditional causal ML, this study assesses econometric methods that some argue can recover causal structures from time series data. The use of these methods can be explained by the significant attention the field of econometrics has given to causality, and specifically to time series, over the years. This presents the possibility of comparing the causal discovery performance between econometric and traditional causal ML algorithms. We seek to understand if there are lessons to be incorporated into causal ML from econometrics, and provide code to translate the results of these econometric methods to the most widely used Bayesian Network R library, bnlearn. We investigate the benefits and challenges that these algorithms present in supporting policy decision-making, using the real-world case of COVID-19 in the UK as an example. Four econometric methods are evaluated in terms of graphical structure, model dimensionality, and their ability to recover causal effects, and these results are compared with those of eleven causal ML algorithms. Amongst our main results, we see that econometric methods provide clear rules for temporal structures, whereas causal-ML algorithms offer broader discovery by exploring a larger space of graph structures that tends to lead to denser graphs that capture more identifiable causal relationships.

We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those that satisfy their own agents' incentive compatibility constraints--depends on the mechanisms offered by the other teams. Following a classic example by Myerson (1982), such games may lack equilibrium due to discontinuities in the correspondence of incentive-compatible mechanisms. We establish general conditions for equilibrium existence by introducing a novel approach that involves tracking both the outcome distributions along the truthful-obedient path and the sets of outcome distributions achievable through unilateral deviations, thereby providing a foundation for analyzing a wide range of multi-principal mechanism design with team production and agency problems.

As generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) automates coding tasks and expands access to technical resources, this paper examines how GenAI-enabled coding automation, colloquially known as "vibecoding," affects digital entrepreneurial entry and venture performance. We exploit ex-ante variation in ventures' exposure to vibecoding based on the product characteristics of their initial launches and estimate difference-in-differences models around the diffusion of GenAI coding tools. Vibecoding increases first-time launches and shortens time to launch, but economically viable entry rises only where vibecoding augments, rather than fully automates, product development. In these partially exposed product segments, viable entry increases by 11%, driven entirely by ventures founded by individuals with STEM education or work experience, especially those whose most recent employment was outside middle management. Among ventures launched before GenAI became widely accessible, performance gains similarly concentrate among partially exposed ventures with engineering-intensive initial teams. Together, these results suggest that GenAI-enabled coding automation does not eliminate the value of technical expertise. Instead, vibecoding creates the greatest value when it complements internal engineering capabilities, allowing ventures to delegate lower-level coding tasks to GenAI while shifting human effort toward higher-level problem solving and dynamic adaptation.

As an IT-enabled multi-passenger mobility service, microtransit can improve accessibility, reduce congestion, and promote sustainability. However, realizing its business potential requires a deeper understanding of traveler preferences, highlighting the need for more effective tools for demand forecasting and revenue management, especially when actual usage data are limited. We propose an innovative modeling approach that integrates travel behavioral insights into microtransit policymaking. The approach operates by (1) leveraging citywide synthetic data to achieve greater spatiotemporal granularity, (2) estimating a nonparametric nested model for joint travel mode and ride-pass subscription choices, and (3) employing a simulation-based method to calculate revenue and traveler benefits under various policy scenarios. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach through a case study in Arlington, TX, one of the largest deployments of microtransit (Via) in the U.S. Using the simulation-based workflow, we evaluate alternative policy scenarios, including ride-pass discounts, event-based subsidies, and place-based subsidies, to assess their impacts on microtransit ridership, system revenue, and traveler welfare. The results indicate that reducing the weekly pass price from $25 to $18.9 and the monthly pass price from $80 to $71.5 would increase total revenue by approximately $127 per day. A 100% trip fare discount could reduce 61 car trips to AT&T Stadium during a game event while generating an additional 82 microtransit trips per day to Medical City Arlington. However, achieving these mode shifts would require subsidies of approximately $533 per event and $483 per day, respectively.

We study which outcomes are implementable by disclosing coarse statistics of a data-generating process rather than its full distribution. Players observe data whose joint distribution is only partially known: they know the expectations of finitely many random variables and form beliefs by maximum-entropy inference. We obtain two characterizations. When message spaces are unrestricted, implementable outcomes coincide with jointly coherent outcomes, expanding the set of correlated equilibria. With canonical mechanisms, implementability reduces to a single cross-entropy condition: the target outcome must lie on the cross-entropy level set of some correlated equilibrium that passes through that equilibrium itself. Examples and several classes of games illustrate the reach of the framework.

This paper proposes self-normalized tests for multistep conditional predictive ability in forecast comparison. By normalizing the sample mean of the transformed loss differential using functionals of its cumulative sum (CUSUM) process, specifically an adjusted-range normalizer for scalars and a matrix normalizer for vectors, our approach avoids direct estimation of the long-run covariance matrix. Consequently, it eliminates the need for the ad hoc bandwidth, kernel, and lag-truncation choices required by traditional methods. We establish the asymptotic theory for these statistics, deriving pivotal null limiting distributions and proving test consistency. Monte Carlo simulations show that the proposed tests effectively mitigate the finite-sample size distortions associated with traditional heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) methods, while retaining strong empirical power against conditional predictability alternatives.

This paper develops a two-period dynastic overlapping-generations (OLG) model in which parents simultaneously choose consumption, savings, fertility, and three distinct dimensions of child quality-education, physical health, and mental health-under a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system. The central innovation is modelling mental health as an independent productivity-enhancing input with its own elasticity $θ$ in a Cobb-Douglas human-capital technology. This yields simple proportional allocation rules and shows how pension policy affects not only the overall level but also the composition of human capital investments. In steady state, higher PAYG contribution rates raise fertility through the Yakita effect but crowd out per-child investments in all quality dimensions, including mental health. An increase in the mental-health elasticity $θ$ shifts resources toward non-cognitive skill development while reducing fertility. These results reveal a fundamental policy tension for developing economies: pension systems that rely on children for old-age support simultaneously increase birth rates while reducing long-term human capital formation, with disproportionate effects on non-cognitive skills. The framework provides theoretical guidance for complementary policies that protect mental-health investments, with particular relevance for countries such as India where children remain a primary source of retirement security and mental-health services are underfunded.

Individual treatment effects are not point-identified from data. The Probability of Necessity and Sufficiency (PNS) circumvents this limitation by characterizing individual-level causality through intersection bounds derived from combined experimental and observational data. In finite samples, however, standard plug-in estimators systematically fail: they violate structural probability constraints and suffer from extremum bias induced by max-min operators, yielding spuriously narrow intervals. We propose a neural framework for finite-sample PNS estimation that resolves both pathologies. We introduce an anchored neural architecture that guarantees structural constraint satisfaction by construction. To correct extremum bias, we employ precision-corrected intersection-bound inference, leveraging Epistemic Neural Networks for scalable, high-dimensional uncertainty quantification. Empirical evaluations confirm that this approach maintains nominal coverage and exact constraint validity in high-dimensional regimes where standard estimators systematically undercover.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) to human preferences typically relies on aggregating pooled feedback into a single reward model. However, this standard approach assumes that all labelers share the same underlying preferences, ignoring the fact that real-world labelers are highly heterogeneous and usually anonymous. Consequently, relying solely on binary choice data fundamentally distorts the learned policy, making the true population-average preference unidentifiable. To overcome this critical limitation, we demonstrate that augmenting preference datasets with a simple, secondary signal -- the user's response time -- can restore the identifiability of the population's average preference. By modeling each decision as a Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM), we introduce a novel, consistent estimator of heterogeneous preferences that successfully corrects the distortions of standard choice-only labels. We prove that our estimator asymptotically converges to the true average preference even in extreme cases where each anonymous labeler contributes only a single choice. Empirically, across both synthetic and real-world datasets, our method consistently outperforms standard baselines that otherwise fail and plateau at a bias floor. Because response times are essentially free to record and require zero user tracking or identification, our results bring promises and open up new opportunities for future data-collection pipelines to improve the social benefit without requiring user-level identifiers or repeated elicitations.

System dynamics is a methodology that is widely used in many academic fields. It explains the behavior of social and economic systems with models that capture complex causality and feedback effects. This 'practice paper' discusses the opportunities and barriers for introducing feedback thinking and system dynamics models in the economics curriculum. We start by providing a pricing feedback model that illustrates some of the benefits that system dynamics can provide in enhancing economics education. Then we summarize the experiences of each of the authors in teaching system dynamics on economics educational programs. This includes different approaches to teaching economics with system dynamics that depend on the learning objectives, the preparation of students, and the background of the instructor. We also develop a four-level course hierarchy for using system dynamics in economics teaching. We then point out the tradeoffs that instructors must consider as they introduce new pedagogies for delivering economics material. Finally, we provide some concluding comments with some suggestions for future work. The expected audiences for this paper are instructors as well as graduate students who are considering academia as a profession.

Previous research has investigated the potential of refugee matching for boosting refugee outcomes, first considered by Bansak et al. (2018). This paper demonstrates the stability of counterfactual impact evaluation results in the context of refugee matching in the United States using a range of off-policy evaluation methods. In order to estimate counterfactual impact and test the robustness of our results, we employ several evaluation methods, including inverse probability weighting (IPW) and multiple variants of augmented inverse probability weighting (AIPW). We also consider various modifications, including alternative modeling architectures and different assignment procedures. The impact estimates remain consistent in magnitude in all scenarios as well as statistically significant in most cases. Furthermore, the estimates are also consistent with the results originally presented in Bansak et al. (2018).

USDC and USDT are the dominant stablecoins pegged to \$1 with a total market capitalization of over \$300B and rising. Stablecoins make dollar value globally accessible with secure transfer and settlement. Yet in practice, these stablecoins experience periods of stress and de-pegging from their \$1 target, posing significant systemic risks. The behavior of market participants during these stress events and the collective actions that either restore or break the peg are not well understood. This paper addresses the question: who restores the peg?. We develop a dynamic, agent-based mean-field game framework for fiat-collateralized stablecoins, in which a large population of arbitrageurs and retail traders strategically interact across primary and secondary markets during a de-peg episode. The key advantage of this equilibrium formulation is that it endogenously maps market frictions into a market-clearing price path and implied net order flows, allowing us to attribute peg-reverting pressure by channel and to stress-test when a given infrastructure becomes insufficient for recovery. Using three historical de-peg events, we show that the calibrated equilibrium reproduces observed recovery half-lives and yields an order flow decomposition in which system-wide stress is predominantly stabilized by primary-market arbitrage. Finally, a quantitative sensitivity analysis identifies a non-linear breakdown threshold, beyond which a de-peg becomes markedly slower to reverse.

Reliable long-horizon value prediction is difficult in offline reinforcement learning because fitted value methods combine bootstrapping, function approximation, and distribution shift, while standard guarantees often require Bellman completeness or realizability. We introduce Bellman calibration, a weak reliability criterion requiring that states assigned similar predicted values have average Bellman targets that agree with those predictions. This criterion yields a scalar calibration error for diagnosing systematic numerical miscalibration, which we estimate from off-policy data using doubly robust Bellman target estimates. We then propose Iterated Bellman Calibration, a model-agnostic post-hoc procedure that recalibrates any learned value predictor by fitting a one-dimensional map of its original prediction, with histogram and isotonic variants. We prove finite-sample guarantees showing that Bellman calibration error is controlled at one-dimensional nonparametric rates without Bellman completeness or value-function realizability. Our value-error bounds separate statistical estimation, finite-iteration, and approximation errors, clarifying when calibration improves value prediction and when its gains are limited by the information in the original predictor or insufficient coverage.

Existing auction mechanisms are vulnerable to bidder collusion, which substantially degrades revenue and non-colluder welfare. To design truthful mechanisms resilient to collusion, we introduce a novel approach that leverages a machine learning classifier to predict (even imprecisely) which bidders are colluding. We first establish a Bulow-Klemperer-type result for multi-unit auctions with single-minded bidders, demonstrating that collusion significantly harms existing mechanisms only when the colluding coalition is large. Consequently, we focus our design on settings with many colluders. Building on the welfare-optimal Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, we propose two novel truthful mechanisms: VCG-Posted Price (V-PoP) and Conditional-Posted Price (C-PoP). V-PoP applies VCG to non-colluding bidders and posted prices to colluding ones, and ensuring truthfulness is non-trivial because we must dynamically split the quantity of items between these groups based on the values of the non-colluder bids. C-PoP further advances this by computing a posted price conditioned on non-colluder bids, and ensuring truthfulness is non-obvious because the posted price is chosen using the values of the non-colluder bids. Because real-world classifiers make errors, we provide theoretical lower bounds on the auction price of V-PoP and C-PoP under misclassification, which theory shows acts as a proxy for welfare and revenue. Crucially, our bounds yield actionable insights for classifier design, revealing that false negatives (misclassifying colluders as non-colluders) are preferable to false positives (misclassifying non-colluders as colluders). Numerical experiments demonstrate that our mechanisms achieve high welfare and revenue against collusion, even when utilizing simple, low-cost classifiers.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to infer rewards from observed behavior, but rewards are not identified from the policy alone: many reward--value pairs can rationalize the same actions. Meaningful reward recovery therefore requires a normalization, yet existing normalized IRL methods often rely on anchor-action restrictions or specialized neural architectures. We study reward recovery in the maximum-entropy, or Gumbel-shock, model under a broad class of statewise affine normalizations, with anchor-action constraints as a special case. This yields Generalized Policy-to-$Q$-to-Reward (GenPQR), a modular procedure that estimates the behavior policy, evaluates its soft $Q$-function through the Bellman equation, and recovers the normalized reward. Both stages can be implemented with off-the-shelf classification and regression methods. We prove modular finite-sample guarantees under general function approximation, with separate policy-estimation and $Q$-estimation errors. As a concrete instantiation, we study GenPQR with fitted $Q$-evaluation, reducing IRL to policy estimation followed by regression. Experiments show that GenPQR matches or improves reward recovery relative to DeepPQR while remaining simpler and more modular. Compared with DeepPQR, our theory goes beyond anchor actions, accommodates large and continuous action spaces, makes coverage requirements explicit, and is not tied to a specific neural-network architecture or training procedure.

The rapid growth of digital shopping channels has prompted many traditional retailers to invest in e-commerce websites and mobile apps. While prior literature shows that multichannel customers are more valuable, it overlooks how the motive for adopting a new channel shapes post-adoption behavior. Using transaction-level data from a major Brazilian pet supplies retailer, we study offline-only consumers who adopt online shopping via four distinct pathways: organic adoption, the COVID-19 pandemic, Black Friday promotions, and a loyalty program. We examine how these pathways affect post-adoption spend, profitability, and channel usage using consumer-level panel data and difference-in-differences estimates. We find that all adopters increase spending relative to offline-only consumers, but their post-adoption behaviors differ systematically by adoption motive. Promotion-driven adopters engage in forward buying and exhibit lower subsequent profitability, whereas COVID-19 adopters display stronger offline persistence consistent with consumer inertia and habit theory. Our findings have important managerial implications: firms should design promotions that discourage stockpiling, reinforce habits among customers pushed online by external shocks, and explicitly account for heterogeneity in channel adoption motives when forecasting customer lifetime value and assessing the breakeven and ROI of promotions designed to induce the adoption of new channels.

This paper studies the problem of testing whether a system of linear equality and inequality constraints admits a solution when the coefficients of that system may have to be estimated. We show that a wide range of inferential questions in partially identified models can be formulated as hypotheses of this form. Our approach exploits an alternative characterization of the hypothesis based on whether the value of a certain linear program is equal to zero. Building on this characterization, we develop bootstrap-based testing procedures and establish their uniform validity over large classes of data-generating processes. Simulation results demonstrate good finite-sample performance, even for moderate sample sizes. We illustrate the usefulness of the approach in two empirical applications.

Cursed Equilibrium of Eyster and Rabin (2005) has been a leading theory for explaining winner's-curse-type behavior in static Bayesian games, but it faces conceptual limitations when applied to dynamic games. Two recent extensions, Cursed Sequential Equilibrium (CSE) by Fong, Lin and Palfrey (2025) and Sequential Cursed Equilibrium (SCE) by Cohen and Li (2026), address these limitations in fundamentally different ways. Complementing these two papers, this paper provides a systematic comparison of CSE and SCE, clarifying their conceptual foundations and technical implications, including their notions of cursedness, belief updating, and treatment of public histories.

We propose a methodology to estimate the market value of pharmaceutical drugs. Our approach combines the event study method with a discounted cash flow model that infers drug values from stock market responses to drug development announcements. We estimate the average value of a drug developed by small firms (those below the 95th percentile of market capitalization) to be \$2.16 billion. At the preclinical stage, the risk-adjusted and present discounted average net value of drugs is \$50 million. Leveraging these estimates, we also determine the expected drug development cost at the start of the discovery stage to be \$38 million. We estimate values and costs for several therapeutic areas (e.g., neoplasm, infections) and explore applying these estimates to design policies that support drug development through drug buyouts and targeted preclinical interventions.

We study actual bidding behavior when a new auction format gets introduced into the marketplace. More specifically, we investigate this question using a novel dataset on internet display advertising auctions that exploits a staggered adoption by different publishers (sellers) of first-price auctions (FPAs), instead of the traditional second-price auctions (SPAs). We analyze the auction format change using difference-in-differences regressions and a synthetic difference-in-differences estimator, which better handles pre-trends. The results show that revenue per sold impression (price) jumps considerably for treated publishers relative to control publishers, with increases ranging from 25% to 75% of the pre-treatment price level of the treated group. Moreover, for later auction format changes, the increase in price levels under FPAs relative to those under SPAs tends to dissipate over time, reminiscent of the revenue equivalence theorem, although the extent of this reversion depends on the specification. We view these results as suggestive of initially insufficient bid shading following the format change, as opposed to an immediate transition to a new Bayesian Nash equilibrium, with prices tending to decline in several specifications in a manner consistent with gradual adjustment in bidding behavior as bidders learn to shade their bids. Our work constitutes one of the first field studies on bidders'responses to auction format changes, providing an important complement to theoretical model predictions. As such, it provides valuable information to auction designers when considering the implementation of different formats.