In this paper, we analyse the impacts of exogenous and endogenous factors on wealth distribution in the Bitcoin token economy, where wealth distribution refers to the distribution of BTC between economic participants or groups of economic participants. The objective of the paper is to analyse the impact of economic policies on wealth distribution in the Bitcoin ecosystem. Different macroeconomic and microeconomic time series are used to eliminate noise in the wealth distribution time series, and the causality analysis is performed between Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (i.e., BIPs) and the cleaned wealth distribution data to reveal possible patterns in the impacts that the endogenous policies have on wealth distribution in token economies. Lastly, a structure for economic policy taxonomy in token economies is proposed where different the policy implementations are illustrated by existing BIPs. This approach highlights the actions available to the policy makers, as well as providing a technique for analysis of policy impacts in token economies and their categorization.

The share of construction trade jobs held by women and people with disabilities has remained stubbornly low in the face of chronic shortages of skilled labor. This study explores the potential of wearable assistive technologies to reduce these disparities. We use U.S. worker-level data to estimate employment and wage differences by gender and by mobility/strength impairments in construction and non-construction jobs. We also use occupational-level data to examine variations in workforce composition, physical skill requirements, and earnings across detailed construction occupations. Regression estimates indicate that being a woman and having strength and mobility impairments are associated with substantial employment and pay gaps in construction compared to non-construction jobs. Further analysis shows a high negative correlation between the representation of women and the ability levels required in those occupations. Finally, we discuss several wearable exoskeletons under development for people with upper-body and lower-body impairments, focusing on how these innovations could be integrated into construction jobs. These findings suggest that wearable exoskeletons that enhance manual dexterity, balance, and strength may improve the representation of women and people with disabilities in some of the higher-paying occupations in construction.

We study the role of contextual information in the online learning problem of brokerage between traders. In this sequential problem, at each time step, two traders arrive with secret valuations about an asset they wish to trade. The learner (a broker) suggests a trading (or brokerage) price based on contextual data about the asset and the market conditions. Then, the traders reveal their willingness to buy or sell based on whether their valuations are higher or lower than the brokerage price. A trade occurs if one of the two traders decides to buy and the other to sell, i.e., if the broker's proposed price falls between the smallest and the largest of their two valuations. We design algorithms for this problem and prove optimal theoretical regret guarantees under various standard assumptions.

We consider a class of optimal portfolio choice problems in continuous time where the agent's transactions create both transient cross-impact driven by a matrix-valued Volterra propagator, as well as temporary price impact. We formulate this problem as the maximization of a revenue-risk functional, where the agent also exploits available information on a progressively measurable price predicting signal. We solve the maximization problem explicitly in terms of operator resolvents, by reducing the corresponding first order condition to a coupled system of stochastic Fredholm equations of the second kind and deriving its solution. We then give sufficient conditions on the matrix-valued propagator so that the model does not permit price manipulation. We also provide an implementation of the solutions to the optimal portfolio choice problem and to the associated optimal execution problem. Our solutions yield financial insights on the influence of cross-impact on the optimal strategies and its interplay with alpha decays.

Portfolio Management is the process of overseeing a group of investments, referred to as a portfolio, with the objective of achieving predetermined investment goals. Portfolio optimization is a key component that involves allocating the portfolio assets so as to maximize returns while minimizing risk taken. It is typically carried out by financial professionals who use a combination of quantitative techniques and investment expertise to make decisions about the portfolio allocation. Recent applications of Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) have shown promising results when used to optimize portfolio allocation by training model-free agents on historical market data. Many of these methods compare their results against basic benchmarks or other state-of-the-art DRL agents but often fail to compare their performance against traditional methods used by financial professionals in practical settings. One of the most commonly used methods for this task is Mean-Variance Portfolio Optimization (MVO), which uses historical time series information to estimate expected asset returns and covariances, which are then used to optimize for an investment objective. Our work is a thorough comparison between model-free DRL and MVO for optimal portfolio allocation. We detail the specifics of how to make DRL for portfolio optimization work in practice, also noting the adjustments needed for MVO. Backtest results demonstrate strong performance of the DRL agent across many metrics, including Sharpe ratio, maximum drawdowns, and absolute returns.

We explore local risk-minimization, a quadratic hedging method for incomplete markets, in exponential additive models. The objectives are to derive explicit mathematical expressions and to conduct numerical experiments. While local risk-minimization is well studied for Lévy processes, little is known for the additive process case because, unlike Lévy processes, the Lévy measure for an additive process depends on time, which significantly complicates the mathematical framework. This paper shall provide a set of necessary conditions for deriving expressions for LRM strategies in exponential additive models, as integrability conditions on the Lévy measure, which allow us to confirm whether these conditions are satisfied for given concrete models. In the final section, we introduce the variance-gamma scaled self-decomposable process, a Sato process that generalizes the variance-gamma process, as a primary example, and perform numerical experiments.

We test whether lying aversion can steer equilibrium selection in mechanism design. In a principal-worker environment, the direct mechanism admits two dominant-strategy equilibria: the designer's target and a worker-optimal outcome. We show this limitation persists for all robust mechanisms, then ask whether framing misreports as explicit lies helps. We develop a 2X2 experiment that varies direct vs. extended mechanisms with implicit vs. explicit messages. We find that framing misreporting of type as an explicit lie shifts play away from the worker-optimal outcome toward truthful reporting, raising designer payoffs with minimal efficiency loss. These findings indicate that lying aversion is an effective lever for aligning behavior with social objectives.

This paper presents a longitudinal open dataset of Spanish public procurement extracted from the Official State Gazette (BOE) covering the period 2014-2024. The dataset integrates structured information on contracts, contracting authorities, suppliers, amounts, and procedures, enabling large-scale quantitative analysis of public procurement dynamics in Spain. We describe the data extraction and normalization pipeline, provide descriptive statistical analyses of temporal and sectoral trends, and discuss potential applications in transparency research, public policy evaluation, and computational social science. The dataset is released to facilitate reproducible research on public procurement and government contracting.

We develop a mixed control framework that combines absolutely continuous controls with impulse interventions subject to stochastic execution delays. The model extends current impulse control formulations by allowing (i) the controller to choose the mean of the stochastic delay of their impulses, and allowing (ii) for multiple pending orders, so that several impulses can be submitted and executed asynchronously at random times. The framework is motivated by an optimal trading problem between centralized (CEX) and decentralized (DEX) exchanges. In DEXs, traders control the distribution of the execution delay through the priority fee paid, introducing a fundamental trade-off between delays, uncertainty, and costs. We study the optimal trading problem of an agent exploiting trading signals in CEXs and DEXs. From a mathematical perspective, we derive the associated dynamic programming principle of this new class of impulse control problems, and establish the viscosity properties of the corresponding quasi-variational inequalities. From a financial perspective, our model provides insights on how to carry out execution across CEXs and DEXs, highlighting how traders manage latency risk optimally through priority fee selection. We show that employing the optimal priority fee has a significant outperformance over non-strategic fee selection.

When individuals in a social network learn about an unknown state from private signals and neighbors' actions, the network structure often causes information loss. We consider rational agents and Gaussian signals in the canonical sequential social-learning problem and ask how the network changes the efficiency of signal aggregation. Rational actions in our model are log-linear functions of observations and admit a signal-counting interpretation of accuracy. Networks where agents observe multiple neighbors but not their common predecessors confound information, and even a small amount of confounding can lead to much lower accuracy. In a class of networks where agents move in generations and observe the previous generations, we quantify the information loss with an aggregative efficiency index. Aggregative efficiency is a simple function of network parameters: increasing in observations and decreasing in confounding. Later generations contribute little additional information, even when generations are arbitrarily large and agents observe arbitrarily far into the past.