We study the committee selection problem in the canonical impartial culture model with a large number of voters and an even larger candidate set. Here, each voter independently reports a uniformly random preference order over the candidates. For a fixed committee size $k$, we ask when a committee can collectively beat every candidate outside the committee by a prescribed majority level $α$. We focus on two natural notions of collective dominance, $α$-winning and $α$-dominating sets, and we identify sharp threshold phenomena for both of them using probabilistic methods, duality arguments, and rounding techniques. We first consider $α$-winning sets. A set $S$ of $k$ candidates is $α$-winning if, for every outside candidate $a \notin S$, at least an $α$-fraction of voters rank some member of $S$ above $a$. We show a sharp threshold at \[ α_{\mathrm{win}}^\star = 1 - \frac{1}{k}. \] Specifically, an $α$-winning set of size $k$ exists with high probability when $α< α_{\mathrm{win}}^\star$, and is unlikely to exist when $α> α_{\mathrm{win}}^\star$. We then study the stronger notion of $α$-dominating sets. A set $S$ of $k$ candidates is $α$-dominating if, for every outside candidate $a \notin S$, there exists a single committee member $b \in S$ such that at least an $α$-fraction of voters prefer $b$ to $a$. Here we establish an analogous sharp threshold at \[ α_{\mathrm{dom}}^\star = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2k}. \] As a corollary, our analysis yields an impossibility result for $α$-dominating sets: for every $k$ and every $α> α_{\mathrm{dom}}^\star = 1 / 2 - 1 / (2k)$, there exist preference profiles that admit no $α$-dominating set of size $k$. This corollary improves the best previously known bounds for all $k \geq 2$.

Evaluating the financial performance of manufacturing firms requires consideration of both the time value of money and the relative importance of multiple decision criteria. Conventional approaches relying solely on deterministic discounting often fail to account for interactions among economic, operational, and managerial factors. This study proposes an integrated framework that combines time-discounted economic analysis with linear regression to evaluate control system efficiency. A theoretical discounting model is first developed to convert costs and benefits occurring at different times into present-value terms using compound interest functions. The model accommodates one-time expenditures, time-proportional costs, and complex cost structures arising during system development and commissioning. To empirically assess how discounted economic performance is influenced by multiple criteria, linear regression serves as the approximation method.

This paper proposes a model of choice via agentic artificial intelligence (AI). A key feature is that the AI may misinterpret a menu before recommending what to choose. A single acyclicity condition guarantees that there is a monotonic interpretation and a strict preference relation that together rationalize the AI's recommendations. Since this preference is in general not unique, there is no safeguard against it misaligning with that of a decision maker. What enables the verification of such AI alignment is interpretations satisfying double monotonicity. Indeed, double monotonicity ensures full identifiability and internal consistency. But, an additional idempotence property is required to guarantee that recommendations are fully rational and remain grounded within the original feasible set.

Grocery retailers frequently apply price discounts to stimulate demand for expiring perishables. However, integrating these discounted sales into future demand forecasts presents a significant challenge. This study investigates the effectiveness of incorporating a fixed share of these sales as \textit{regular} demand into the forecast, as commonly applied in practice. We employ a two-step regression approach on data from a major European grocery retailer, covering over 1,700 products across 676 stores. We reveal that forecasts underestimate actual demand for most SKUs when discounted sales occur. This residual uplift effect is significantly influenced by the number of sales at reduced prices. Our findings underscore the necessity for more precise approaches to integrate discounted sales into demand forecasts, thereby preventing excess inventory and the associated economic and environmental impacts of spoilage in the grocery sector.

This study investigates minimax and Bayes optimal strategies for fixed-budget best-arm identification. We consider an adaptive procedure consisting of a sampling phase followed by a recommendation phase, and we design an adaptive experiment within this framework to efficiently identify the best arm, defined as the one with the highest expected outcome. In our proposed strategy, the sampling phase consists of two stages. The first stage is a pilot phase, in which we allocate samples uniformly across arms to eliminate clearly suboptimal arms and to estimate outcome variances. Before entering the second stage, we solve a Gaussian minimax game, which yields a sampling ratio and a decision rule. In the second stage, samples are allocated according to this sampling ratio. After the sampling phase, the procedure enters the recommendation phase, where we select an arm using the decision rule. We prove that this single strategy is simultaneously asymptotically minimax and Bayes optimal for the simple regret, and we establish upper bounds that coincide exactly with our lower bounds, including the constant terms.

Many methods are available for assessing the importance of omitted variables in linear regression. These methods typically make different, non-falsifiable assumptions. Hence the data alone cannot tell us which method is most appropriate. Since it is unreasonable to expect results to be robust against all possible robustness checks, researchers often use methods deemed ``interpretable,'' a subjective criterion with no formal definition. In contrast, we develop the first formal, axiomatic framework for comparing and selecting among these methods. Our framework is analogous to the standard approach for comparing estimators based on their sampling distributions. We propose that sensitivity parameters be selected based on their covariate sampling distributions, a design distribution of parameter values induced by an assumption on how covariates are assigned to be observed or unobserved. Using this idea, we define new concepts of parameter consistency and monotonicity, and argue that a reasonable sensitivity parameter should satisfy both properties. We prove that the literature's most popular approach is inconsistent and non-monotonic, while several alternatives satisfy both.

Response times contain information about economically relevant but unobserved variables like willingness to pay, preference intensity, quality, or happiness. We provide a general characterization of the properties of latent variables that can be detected using response time data. Our theoretical framework unifies and generalizes results in the literature and gives rise to many new applications. We illustrate the rich insights that the method can deliver through several empirical applications: revealed preference analysis, identifying an optimal nudge, testing decreasing marginal happiness of income, and predicting treatment heterogeneity.

Omitted variables are one of the most important threats to the identification of causal effects. Several widely used methods assess the impact of omitted variables on empirical conclusions by comparing measures of selection on observables with measures of selection on unobservables. The recent literature has discussed various limitations of these existing methods, however. This includes challenges that arise when the omitted variables are endogenous, meaning that they are correlated with the included controls. We develop a new approach to regression sensitivity analysis that avoids those limitations, while still allowing researchers to calibrate sensitivity parameters by comparing the magnitude of selection on observables with the magnitude of selection on unobservables as in previous methods. We illustrate our results in an empirical study of the effect of historical American frontier life on modern cultural beliefs. Finally, we implement these methods in the companion Stata module regsensitivity for easy use in practice.

We provide Dutch-book arguments against misspecified Bayesian learning. An agent progressively learns about a state and is offered a bet after every discovery. We say the agent is deterministically Dutch-booked when they would accept all bets, but their payoff is ex-post negative under each state. More generally, we say that the agent is Dutch-booked when they would accept all bets, but their expected payoff under each fundamental state is negative. With this, the agent cannot be deterministically Dutch-booked if and only if they update their beliefs using Bayes' rule, even with misspecified likelihoods. The agent cannot be Dutch booked if and only if they update their beliefs using Bayes' rule with a lexicographic prior and using the correct data-generating process. We show that offers of financial instruments and behavior in Monty Hall problems can be viewed as Dutch books that extract a sure expected gain from a misspecified population.

Estimating total treatment effects in the presence of network interference typically requires knowledge of the underlying interaction structure. However, in many practical settings, network data is either unavailable, incomplete, or measured with substantial error. We demonstrate that causal message passing, a methodology that leverages temporal structure in outcome data rather than network topology, can recover total treatment effects comparable to network-aware approaches. We apply causal message passing to two large-scale field experiments where a recently developed bipartite graph methodology, which requires network knowledge, serves as a benchmark. Despite having no access to the interaction network, causal message passing produces effect estimates that match the network-aware approach in direction across all metrics and in statistical significance for the primary decision metric. Our findings validate the premise of causal message passing: that temporal variation in outcomes can serve as an effective substitute for network observation when estimating spillover effects. This has important practical implications: practitioners facing settings where network data is costly to collect, proprietary, or unreliable can instead exploit the temporal dynamics of their experimental data.

This paper provides a critical examination of the empirical basis of the output convergence debate in the light of recent developments in the analysis of dynamic heterogeneous panels with interactive effects. It shows that popular tools such as Barro's cross-country regressions and two-way fixed effects (TWFE) estimators that assume parallel trends and homogeneous dynamics lead to substantial under-estimation of the speed of convergence and misleading inference. Instead, dynamic common correlated effects (DCCE) estimators due to Chudik and Pesaran (2015a) provide consistent estimates and valid inference that are robust to nonparallel trends and correlated heterogeneity and apply even if there are breaks, trends and/or unit roots in the latent technology factor. It also suggests a way to estimate the effect of slowly moving determinants of growth. The theoretical findings are augmented with empirical evidence using Penn World Tables data, finding little evidence of per capita output convergence across countries, very slow evidence of cross country growth convergence, and reasonably fast within country convergence. Capital accumulation is found to be the most important single determinant of cross-country differences in output while slow moving indicators such as potential for conflict and protection of property rights proved to be statistically significant determinants of the steady state levels of output per capita. We are also able to replicate a positive evidence of democratization on output, but we find that the statistical significance of this effect to fall as we allow for nonparallel trends and dynamic heterogeneity.

We study a dynamic matching problem on a two-sided platform with unbalanced patience, in which long-lived supply accumulates over time with a unit waiting cost per period, while short-lived demand departs if not matched promptly. High- or low-quality agents arrive sequentially with one supply agent and one demand agent arriving in each period, and matching payoffs are supermodular. In the centralized benchmark, the optimal policy follows a threshold-based rule that rations high-quality supply, preserving it for future high-quality demand. In the decentralized system, where self-interested agents decide whether to match under an exogenously specified payoff allocation proportion, we characterize a welfare-maximizing Markov perfect equilibrium. Unlike outcomes in the centralized benchmark or in full-backlog markets, the equilibrium exhibits distinct matching patterns in which low-type demand may match with high-type supply even when low-type supply is available. Unlike settings in which both sides have long-lived agents and perfect coordination is impossible, the decentralized system can always be perfectly aligned with the centralized optimum by appropriately adjusting the allocation of matching payoffs across agents on both sides. Finally, when the arrival probabilities for H- and L-type arrivals are identical on both sides, we compare social welfare across systems with different patience levels: full backlog on both sides, one-sided backlog, and no backlog. In the centralized setting, social welfare is weakly ordered across systems. However, in the decentralized setting, the social welfare ranking across the three systems depends on the matching payoff allocation rule and the unit waiting cost, and enabling patience can either increase or decrease social welfare.

Credit exposure in Decentralized Finance (DeFi) is often implicit and token-mediated, creating a dense web of inter-protocol dependencies. Thus, a shock to one token may result in significant and uncontrolled contagion effects. As the DeFi ecosystem becomes increasingly linked with traditional financial infrastructure through instruments, such as stablecoins, the risk posed by this dynamic demands more powerful quantification tools. We introduce DeXposure-FM, the first time-series, graph foundation model for measuring and forecasting inter-protocol credit exposure on DeFi networks, to the best of our knowledge. Employing a graph-tabular encoder, with pre-trained weight initialization, and multiple task-specific heads, DeXposure-FM is trained on the DeXposure dataset that has 43.7 million data entries, across 4,300+ protocols on 602 blockchains, covering 24,300+ unique tokens. The training is operationalized for credit-exposure forecasting, predicting the joint dynamics of (1) protocol-level flows, and (2) the topology and weights of credit-exposure links. The DeXposure-FM is empirically validated on two machine learning benchmarks; it consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art approaches, including a graph foundation model and temporal graph neural networks. DeXposure-FM further produces financial economics tools that support macroprudential monitoring and scenario-based DeFi stress testing, by enabling protocol-level systemic-importance scores, sector-level spillover and concentration measures via a forecast-then-measure pipeline. Empirical verification fully supports our financial economics tools. The model and code have been publicly available. Model: https://huggingface.co/EVIEHub/DeXposure-FM. Code: https://github.com/EVIEHub/DeXposure-FM.

We study the design of optimal allocation mechanisms in an environment where agents and goods arrive stochastically. Agents have private types that determine the principal payoff. Either agents or goods can be held in a queue at a flow cost until allocation. The principal cannot use monetary transfers, but can verify agents types at a cost. We characterize the optimal mechanism at the steady state of the system. It is a dynamic threshold mechanism in which the principal sets type thresholds for agent admission and goods allocation. These thresholds depend on the current state of the mechanism. The model applies to public programs such as public housing and grant allocation, and to allocation problems within organizations such as capital budgeting.

This study models a Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) system as a multi-leader-multi-follower game that captures the complex interactions among the MaaS platform, service operators, and travelers. We consider a coopetitive setting where the MaaS platform purchases service capacity from service operators and sells multi-modal trips to travelers following an origin-destination-based pricing scheme; meanwhile, service operators use their remaining capacities to serve single-modal trips. As followers, travelers make both mode choices, including whether to use MaaS, and route choices in the multi-modal transportation network, subject to prices and congestion. Inspired by the dual formulation for traffic assignment problems, we propose a novel single-level variational inequality (VI) formulation by introducing a virtual traffic operator, along with the MaaS platform and multiple service operators. A key advantage of the proposed VI formulation is that it supports parallel solution procedures and thus enables large-scale applications. We prove that an equilibrium solution always exists given the negotiated wholesale price of service capacity. Numerical experiments on a small network further demonstrate that the wholesale price can be tailored to align with varying system-wide objectives. The proposed MaaS system demonstrates potential for creating a "win-win-win" outcome -- service operators and travelers are better off compared to the "without MaaS" scenario, meanwhile the MaaS platform remains profitable. Such a Pareto-improving regime can be explicitly specified with the wholesale capacity price. Similar conclusions are drawn from the experiment of an extended multi-modal Sioux Falls network, which also validates the scalability of the proposed model and solution algorithm.

In this paper, we consider diffusion index forecasting with both tensor and non-tensor predictors, where the tensor structure is preserved with a Canonical Polyadic (CP) tensor factor model. When the number of non-tensor predictors is small, we study the asymptotic properties of the least squares estimator in this tensor factor-augmented regression, allowing for factors with different strengths. We derive an analytical formula for prediction intervals that accounts for the estimation uncertainty of the latent factors. In addition, we propose a novel thresholding estimator for the high-dimensional covariance matrix that is robust to cross-sectional dependence. When the number of non-tensor predictors exceeds or diverges with the sample size, we introduce a multi-source factor-augmented sparse regression model and establish the consistency of the corresponding penalized estimator. Simulation studies validate our theoretical results and an empirical application to U.S. trade flows demonstrates the advantages of our approach over other popular methods in the literature.

This paper develops an intuitive concept of perfect dependence between two variables of which at least one has a nominal scale. Perfect dependence is attainable for all marginal distributions. It furthermore proposes a set of dependence measures that are 1 if and only if this perfect dependence is satisfied. The advantages of these dependence measures relative to classical dependence measures like contingency coefficients, Goodman-Kruskal's lambda and tau and the so-called uncertainty coefficient are twofold. Firstly, they are defined if one of the variables exhibits continuities. Secondly, they satisfy the property of attainability. That is, they can take all values in the interval [0,1] irrespective of the marginals involved. Both properties are not shared by classical dependence measures which need two discrete marginal distributions and can in some situations yield values close to 0 even though the dependence is strong or even perfect. Additionally, the paper provides a consistent estimator for one of the new dependence measures together with its asymptotic distribution under independence as well as in the general case. This allows to construct confidence intervals and an independence test with good finite sample properties, as a subsequent simulation study shows. Finally, two applications on the dependence between the variables country and income, and country and religion, respectively, illustrate the use of the new measure.

We study efficient mechanism design for allocating multiple heterogeneous objects. The aim is to maximize the residual surplus, the total value generated from an allocation minus the costs of screening. We discover a robust trend indicating that no-screening mechanisms, such as serial dictatorship with exogenous priority order, tend to perform better as the variety of goods increases. We analyze the underlying reasons by characterizing asymptotically efficient mechanisms in a stylized environment. We also apply an automated mechanism design approach to numerically derive efficient mechanisms and validate the trend in general environments. Building on these implications, we propose the register-invite-book system (RIB) as an efficient system for scheduling vaccinations against pandemic diseases.

This paper studies multi-object reallocation without monetary transfers, where agents initially own multiple indivisible objects and have strict preferences over bundles (e.g., shift exchange among workers at a firm). Focusing on marginal rules that elicit only rankings over individual objects, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the generalized Top Trading Cycles rule (TTC) on the lexicographic and responsive domains. On the lexicographic domain, TTC is characterized by balancedness, individual-good efficiency, the worst-endowment lower bound, and either truncation-proofness or drop strategy-proofness. On the responsive domain, TTC is the unique marginal rule satisfying individual-good efficiency, truncation-proofness, and either the worst-endowment lower bound or individual rationality. In the Shapley--Scarf housing market, TTC is characterized by Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and truncation-proofness. Finally, on the conditionally lexicographic domain, the augmented Top Trading Cycles rule is characterized by balancedness, Pareto efficiency, the worst-endowment lower bound, and drop strategy-proofness. The conditionally lexicographic domain is a maximal domain on which Pareto efficiency coincides with individual-good efficiency.